By: Robert D. (Bob) Jenkins, Sr.
For more than 150 years, Civil War historians have remained baffled over the Cassville controversies. There are two conflicting versions of events: one from Confederate commanding Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and the other from Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood. But Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman pursued his own plans, leaving the Confederates "surprised" in the woods and fields of Bartow County, near Cartersville, Georgia.
At the heart of the Cassville affair were two Confederate dilemmas: first, whether to attack a portion of the Federal army in the morning; and second, once the morning attack was deemed unfeasible, whether to stay and fight the following day. Both decisions were the responsibility of Johnston, and both decisions involved advice and assistance by Hood.
On the morning of May 19, 1864, Johnston issued a General Order declaring the army’s retreat had ended, and the time had come to turn and face the enemy. Yet, after a series of unforeseen developments, the Southern commander chose to withdraw from Cassville without engaging in a major fight.
Several factors played a hand in the decision to retreat from Cassville. Chief among them was the “fog of war,” a term coined by military theorist Carl von Clausewitz to describe the uncertainly and chaos of battle that can disrupt even the best laid plans. As fate would have it, both accidental mishaps and enemy actions compounded to derail Confederate strategies at Cassville.
Due to an oversight in Confederate map-making, a key road was not properly identified, leaving the Confederate cavalry screen unable to protect Hood’s column of infantry, which was marching to execute a flanking surprise attack on a vulnerable portion of the Federal army. This lapse allowed Brig. Gen. Edward McCook and his Federal cavalrymen to penetrate the rear and flank of Hood’s forces, unraveling the Confederate plan.
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in uniform, ca 1862
Public Domain
Additionally, Sherman had his eyes set on Kingston as the target of his army, not Cassville. Like spokes of a wagon wheel pointing toward the center, Sherman ordered his six infantry corps to converge on Kingston, with each column supporting the others as the widely scattered corps converged. As a result, Hood’s intended target, Maj. Gen. John Schofield’s XXIII Corps, did not march into the intended trap. Even if McCook’s cavalry had not frustrated Hood’s plan, the Confederate attackers would have been striking at air, for Schofield was not where they expected and when they had anticipated. In fact, Schofield and his corps would not arrive in the vicinity of Cassville until after 4 p.m., long after Hood’s attacking force had abandoned the plan.
Cassville was supposed to be the site of a bold Southern counterattack, where Johnston and Hood would turn the tide on Sherman and reverse Confederate fortunes in Georgia, and with it the wider war. Instead, Sherman’s decisions in the “fog of war” served to both successfully (and accidentally) prevent Schofield’s force from being struck in a surprise ambush, and to successfully (and intentionally) thrust McCook’s cavalry into the unsuspecting underbelly of Hood’s marching column.
For 160 years, Johnston successfully deflected blame for the failure at Cassville, shifting the narrative to suit his legacy. But, as this new study has revealed, there was plenty of blame to go around.
